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1 Introduction  
Over the past two decades there has been an increased fragmentation and integration of production and 
innovation within and across national borders driven by technological change and trade liberalisation 
(Antràs and Chor 2013; Siedschlag and Murphy 2015). Furthermore, over the same period, there has been 
an increased integration of services and manufacturing activities via vertical integration and outsourcing 
(Pilat and Wölfl 2005; Francois and Wörz 2008). It has been established theoretically and empirically that 
trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) patterns are jointly determined with organisational structures 
such as vertical integration and outsourcing strategies. Recent reviews of this evidence include Helpman 
(2006) and Antràs and Chor (2013). There is also growing evidence showing that international production 
and innovation networks have heightened the transmission of macroeconomic shocks across countries 
(Kohler 2004; Costinot, Vogel and Wang 2013).  
Within-industry firm heterogeneity is at the centre of the most recent theoretical models explaining the 
increased fragmentation and integration of production and innovation and linkages between manufacturing 
and services (Grossman and Helpman 2002; Antràs 2003; Antràs and Helpman 2004, 2008). However, 
most existing empirical evidence related to intra-EU production and trade linkages is based on the analysis 
of industry and country data (see e.g. Stehrer et al. 2012; Foster-McGregor et al. 2013; Stöllinger et al. 2015; 
Leitner and Stehrer, 2014). To uncover the extent and intensity of intra-EU linkages, cross-country analysis 
using comparable firm-level datasets is needed.  
Recent evidence on the Single Market integration and competitiveness in the EU and its Member States 
(European Commission 2015) indicates that reforms at both the EU and Member States levels could 
improve productivity and competitiveness. Specifically, it has been highlighted that removing regulatory 
barriers to competitiveness and integration would allow a more efficient allocation of resources across firms 
and sectors in the Single Market. In this context, one of the identified sources of productivity growth is the 
geographic reallocation of resources within the Single Market and the more efficient integration of EU 
firms in international value chains. This reallocation of resources would also lead to a better exploitation of 
backward and forward linkages in global value chains by strengthening the integration of business services 
in key manufacturing sectors.  
In this context, understanding what determines intra-EU production and trade linkages at firm-level across 
EU countries is key to design policies aimed at competitiveness and growth at the firm, industry, country 
and European levels.  This paper examines the inputs sourcing strategies of manufacturing firms established 
in the EU and identifies institutional and regulatory factors that could foster further integration across EU 
countries, particularly with respect to the integration of services inputs by manufacturing firms. 
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews the relevant theoretical and empirical 
evidence and provides a conceptual framework for the analysis. Section 3 describes the data and empirical 
methodology used. Next, Section 4 discusses the results of the empirical analysis of determinants of intra-
EU production and trade linkages. A special focus of the analysis is on institutional and regulatory factors 
in the EU countries which are relevant in the context of strengthening the Single Market. Finally, Section 
5 summarizes the key findings of the empirical analysis and, on that basis, discusses policy implications for 
strengthening the Single Market. 
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2 Theoretical and Empirical Background  
This section provides an overview of the relevant theoretical and empirical literature on firms’ inputs 
sourcing strategies with the aim to guide the proposed empirical analysis on determinants of intra-EU 
production and trade linkages across Member States. The key features of this literature are an incomplete-
contracting environment and firm heterogeneity with respect to productivity. These features are crucial in 
shaping firms’ internationalisation and organisational choices.     
Grossman and Helpman (2002) were among the pioneers of this new strand of the international trade 
literature. They examine firms’ choice between outsourcing and vertical integration. In determining their 
organisational mode, firms, which are assumed to be equally productive, are faced with the trade-off 
between the costs of running a large and less specialised organisation versus the search and monitoring 
costs of an input supplier. The authors show that outsourcing is likely to be more prevalent in some 
industries than in others. Outsourcing is more likely to be viable in large firms and in large economies. Also, 
in competitive markets outsourcing requires a high per unit cost advantage for specialised input producers 
relative to integrated firms, while in markets with less competition, outsourcing depends on the comparison 
of the fixed costs between specialised producers and integrated firms.  
Following on the questions raised by Grossman and Helpman (2002), Antràs (2003) focused on incomplete 
contracts to explain why some firms source inputs abroad within their boundary via FDI, while others 
source them at arm’s length, via outsourcing. Combined with productivity differences across firms within 
industries, this approach predicts the relative prevalence of alternative forms of the international 
organization of production as a function of sectoral characteristics and differences in features of the trading 
partners.  Further, Antràs and Helpman (2004) formalise theoretically the decision of firms to engage in 
international markets either through foreign outsourcing or FDI. Their model predicts that in a vertically 
integrated industry, the most productive firms source their intermediates from an owned affiliate while less 
productive firms outsource them from arm’s length suppliers.  
Helpman (2006) reviews the theoretical and empirical literature on international trade, FDI and 
organization choices of firms. He highlights that productivity differences are linked to different choices for 
the organization choices of production and distribution. In this context, international trade and FDI 
patterns are jointly determined with organizational structures such as sourcing and integration strategies. 
The theoretical models in international trade and investment focus on individual firms’ choices of 
engagement in activities across national borders linked to firm and industry characteristics and the returns 
from foreign trade and investment. Organisational choices such as outsourcing and integration strategies 
are important in this context (Spencer 2005). Firms engaged in international activities such as exporting and 
FDI differ systematically from firms serving only home markets. Only a small fraction of firms export, and 
these are larger, more productive than non-exporters. Another established empirical fact is that only a few 
large firms export to large markets (Eaton, Kortum and Kramarz 2004).  A small fraction of firms engage 
in FDI, and these are larger and more productive than exporters. The distribution of firms by size and 
productivity varies across industries.  The classification of FDI in horizontal and vertical has become 
meaningless as multinationals invest in low-cost countries to create export platforms from which they serve 
other countries across the world and the large flows of FDI across developed countries cannot be classified 
as horizontal FDI. The evidence also indicates that multinational firms have more complex integration 
strategies than firms serving only the domestic market (Feinberg and Keane 2006; Yeaple 2003; Grossman, 
Helpman, and Szeidl 2005).  
Antràs and Chor (2013) develop a property–rights theoretical model of multinational firm boundary choices 
along the value chains. They show that the relative position (upstream or downstream) at which suppliers 
enter the production chain is a key determinant of the integration choice. Furthermore, the final-good 
producer’s elasticity of demand is crucially important in shaping the nature of the relationship between 
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integration and the degree of “downstreamness”.  The novelty of this model compared to previous 
property-rights models of multinational firm boundaries (Antràs 2003, 2005; Antràs and Helpman 2004) 
consists in the introduction of a natural (or technological) sequencing of production stages which implies 
that production at a specific stage can start only after the delivery of inputs from all upstream stages. In an 
incomplete-contracting environment, property rights are a source of bargaining power and an incentive for 
firms’ integration along the value chain. Antràs (2015) highlights that while advances in ICT and falling 
trade barriers have fostered fragmenting production across firms and countries, contractual frictions remain 
a significant obstacle to the globalization of value chains due to the low level of enforcement of contract 
clauses and legal remedies.   
Alfaro et al. (2017) build on and expand the model developed by Antràs and Chor (2013) and demonstrate 
that contractual frictions play an important role in shaping the integration choices of firms. By combining 
data on production activities of public and private firms operating in over 100 countries with information 
from Input-Output tables they construct measures of firms’ relative position along the value chains, the 
“upstreamness/downstreamness” of integrated and non-integrated inputs. Using these novel measures, 
they find that a firm’s propensity to integrate a given stage of the value chain is shaped by the relative 
contractibility of the stages located upstream versus downstream from that stage, as well as by the firm’s 
productivity. Further, this evidence highlights that organizational decisions have spillovers along the value 
chain in that relationship-specific investments made by upstream suppliers affect the incentives of suppliers 
in downstream stages.   
Existing empirical evidence suggests that firms with international activities tend to engage in multiple 
internationalisation modes (such as exporting, international outsourcing, foreign direct investment) to make 
the most of global opportunities in order to reduce costs, expand outputs, and maximize returns (Yeaple 
2003; Grossman et al. 2005). The decision to engage in internationalisation activities and the optimal choice 
of outward international activities differs across heterogeneous firms and industries.  
Helpman, Melitz and Yeaple (2004) demonstrate theoretically that when foreign direct investment is 
motivated by market access, the least productive firms exit, the next more productive firms serve only the 
home market, the next more productive firms enter foreign markets through exporting and the most 
productive firms become multinationals and enter foreign markets through foreign direct investment.   
Empirical evidence for this sorting of firms into international activities is provided for Ireland by Girma, 
Görg, and Strobl (2004); for the United Kingdom by Girma, Kneller and Pisu (2005).  Using firm-level data 
from Japan, Head and Reis (2003) show that when firms invest abroad for efficiency related reasons (factor 
prices), the least productive firms locate abroad in small countries while the more productive produce at 
home. Using data for the US companies, Yeaple (2003) examined firms engaged simultaneously in vertical 
and horizontal FDI.  Siedschlag and Murphy (2015) examined the extent and determinants of firms’ 
engagement in outward international activities associated with European and global value chains. The 
empirical evidence indicates that, in the group of firms with outward international activities, a large number 
are exporters only, while a small number of firms engage in international sourcing only or in foreign direct 
investment only. Firms engaged simultaneously in more than one type of outward international activity are 
only a few. These firms are more mature, larger, more productive, and have higher product innovation rates 
than those engaged in single international activities.  
Nunn and Trefler (2013) construct measures of industry characteristics from disaggregated US import data 
and find that an industry’s skill, capital and R&D intensity predict intra-firm trade shares as expected.  
Furthermore, they show that the type of capital intensity matters: industries with capital which is not firm-
specific do not have high levels of intra-industry trade. 
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Industry R&D and capital intensity explain better the share of international trade conducted within 
multinationals rather than outsourcing (Bernard, Jensen, Redding and Schott 2012). Tomiura (2007) uses 
micro data from Japan and provides evidence on the role of productivity in conditioning the sorting of 
firms into exporting, FDI and international outsourcing activities. He finds that firms engaged in FDI are 
more productive than exporters and firms engaged in foreign outsourcing. Furthermore, he finds that firms 
engaged in international outsourcing are less capital intensive than other firms with international activities.        
In summary, the review of existing theoretical and empirical literature on global sourcing of production 
inputs provides useful insights and suggests the following predictions which guide the empirical analysis in 
this paper:    
• Input sourcing choices are determined by characteristics of firms and industries as well as institutional 
and regulatory characteristics of home and host countries;   
• More productive firms are more likely to source inputs via foreign direct investment rather than at 
arm’s length;  
• Contractual frictions increase the likelihood of input sourcing via foreign direct investment rather than 
at arms’ length;  
• Firms in industries which are more intensive in R&D and tangible capital are more likely to source 
inputs via foreign direct investment;   
• Relationship-specific investments made by upstream suppliers affect the incentives of suppliers in 
downstream stages of the value chain. 
This survey of existing literature also suggests questions to be examined in the empirical analysis:   
• What is the extent and intensity of intra-EU production and trade linkages at industry and firm levels?  
• What firm, industry and country characteristics determine the patterns of intra-EU production and 
trade linkages? What role do regulatory barriers play in explaining these patterns?  
• What determines the sourcing choices of manufacturing firms in the EU? What role do regulatory 
barriers play in firms’ inputs sourcing strategies?  
In particular, the evidence provided by this paper contributes to better understand determinants of firms’ 
inputs sourcing strategies across EU countries and how these factors relate to the Single Market in goods 
and services. This new evidence improves the knowledge base for structural reforms at the EU and Member 
States levels aiming at removing regulatory barriers to competitiveness and integration and a more efficient 
allocation of resources across firms and sectors in the Single Market of goods and services.   
3 Data and Descriptive Analysis   
For the purpose of this analysis, we combine information on the ownership structure and company 
accounts from the Orbis data set with input-output (I-O) data from the World Input-Output Tables (WIOT) 
data set.2  
Using the most recent information on ownership (information on company hierarchical ownership links 
updated to April 2017) combined with company accounts from the Orbis data set (we use information on 
financial variables for 2014), we identify parent companies established in the 28 EU countries. Using the 
NACE codes for primary activities, we identify 7,012 parent companies in manufacturing for which 
financial variables are available. Using the ownership structure of the identified parent companies, we 
uncover their affiliates located in the 28 EU countries. The 7,012 parent manufacturing firms are linked to 
19,997 affiliates of which 7,230 are in manufacturing, 10,777 in services and 1,990 in other sectors. Sectors 
                                                          
2 See Timmer et al. (2015) for a description of the WIOT data set.  
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other than manufacturing and services include: agriculture, forestry, fishing; mining and quarrying; utilities; 
and construction. 
3.1 Firms’ input sourcing choices: integration vs. outsourcing   
For each parent company (global ultimate owner, g) we identify integrated and outsourced inputs following 
the methodology used by Alfaro et al. (2017)3 by combining information on firms’ ownership structure 
from the Orbis data set4 with Input-Output (I-O) data for the EU countries.  
For each g, we identify the primary NACE 2-digit code as its output industry j. Given that the WIOT data 
allow to identify input-output linkages across countries, for each output industry j in each home country c 
we identify a set of production inputs }.0:{,, >= ihjc
hi
cj aiI  ihjca is the value of input i in host country h 
required to produce one unit (€1) of production in industry j in home country c. The world input – output 
tables include information on 56 industries in each of the 28 EU countries which result in 1568 country – 
industry input-output linkages. 
For each parent company g, we then identify integrated and outsourced inputs as follows. The set of 
integrated inputs hi cjI
,
,  comprises the affiliates in country h whose primary (NACE 2-digit) activity 
corresponds to a production input i for output j in country c, as identified in the input-output tables. We 
designate the remainder of hi cjI
,
,  inputs for which no affiliate is detected as possible outsourced inputs.5    
By linking the ownership information with the input-output data for the 28 EU countries we identify 
10,492,482 possible input-output production linkages for the parent companies in manufacturing, of which 
14,245 are integrated links between parent and affiliated firms.  
As mentioned above, the number of affiliates in the data is larger than the number of identified integrated 
input linkages which implies that some parent companies source the same input from multiple affiliates in 
the same country. In the descriptive analysis in this section we disregard these multiple affiliates, focusing 
only on ownership links that, for each parent, identify input-output links uniquely. This avoids inflating the 
descriptive figures with multiple counting of inputs. However, in the empirical estimations all ownership 
links will be exploited.  
Table 1 below describes patterns of inputs sourcing by manufacturing parent companies established in the 
EU countries. Table 1 shows that, on average, manufacturing parent firms source 2.04 inputs intra-firm; by 
construction, the average number of possible outsourced is much larger, 1,566. The maximum number of 
integrated inputs by one parent company is 109 while the lowest number of possible outsourced inputs is 
1,459.  
Table 1: Inputs sourcing by manufacturing companies established in EU countries  
  Mean Median Min Max 
Integrated inputs 2.04 1 1 109 
Possible outsourced inputs 1,566 1,567 1,459 1,567 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the linked data from Orbis and WIOT data sets.  
                                                          
3 Alfaro et al. (2017) draw on Fan and Lang (2000).  
4 We extract the most recent data available in the Orbis data set provided by the Bureau van Dijk.  
5 Having only information on the set of inputs (i.e. sector-host country combinations in the I-O table with positive 
requirement coefficient) that correspond to an affiliate, we are left to label the set of industry-country combination 
inputs with no corresponding ownership link as outsourced inputs. However, we are aware that each firm may decide 
to source only a fraction of the latter inputs, hence our notation refers to possible outsourced inputs.    
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Table 2 disaggregates the information on integrated inputs by the sector of the affiliate. Among the 7,012 
parent firms in manufacturing, 2,191 source manufacturing only, 2,689 source service inputs only, 1,596 
source both manufacturing and service inputs, while 536 parent companies source inputs other than 
manufacturing and/or services. The highest average number of integrated inputs, 5.08, is found for parent 
firms which source both manufacturing and services inputs.   
Table 2: Patterns of integrated inputs by manufacturing firms established in EU countries  
Linkage type  
Number of parent 
companies 
(GUOs) 
Mean  
Min  Max 
Integrated inputs 
 
Manufacturing – Services 2,689 1.21 1 23 
 
Manufacturing – Manufacturing 2,191 1.09 1 6 
Manufacturing – Manufacturing and Services  1,596 5.08 2 109 
Manufacturing – neither Manufacturing nor 
Services 536 1.02 1 3 
Total 7,012 2.04 1 109 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the linked data from Orbis and WIOT data sets.  
Table 3 show summary statistics of the characteristics of parent firms broken down by type of input they 
integrate. 
Among all manufacturing parent firms, firms integrating both manufacturing and services inputs are the 
largest, and have the highest productivity, capital (both tangible and intangible) and skills intensities. 
Relative to manufacturing firms which integrate manufacturing inputs only, manufacturing firms which 
integrate services inputs only are larger, less productive, and less intensive in capital and skills.  
Table 3: Summary statistics for manufacturing firms with integrated inputs established in EU countries 
Linkage type Value-Added per Employee 
Tangible 
capital 
Intensity 
Intangible 
capital 
Intensity 
Skills 
Intensity Employees 
Manufacturing – Services 142.51 158.03 12.54 48.6 104.99 
Manufacturing – Manufacturing 156.8 216.69 13.95 50.08 84.36 
Manufacturing – Manufacturing 
and Services 262.83 379.64 22.67 75.15 1176.07 
Manufacturing – neither 
Manufacturing nor Services 218.41 316.09 12.27 56.6 56.76 
 
Total 180.21 239.02 15.29 55.73 338.64 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on the linked data from Orbis and WIOT data sets.  
Table 4 shows the distribution of parent firms and the intensity of integrated inputs across EU countries. 
Ireland, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom have the highest intensity of integrated inputs by 
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manufacturing companies. The United Kingdom and the Netherlands have also the highest average 
integrated inputs by services firms.6   
Table 4: The distribution of parent companies and the intensity of integrated inputs across EU countries   
Country of parent company -
GUO 
Number of manufacturing 
GUOs 
Mean number of integrated 
inputs by manufacturing GUOs 
Austria 23 6.91 
Belgium 147 2.72 
Bulgaria 4 2 
Czech Republic  398 1.48 
Germany 612 4.01 
Denmark 5 15 
Estonia 34 1.15 
Spain 1,151 1.53 
Finland 336 2.79 
France 375 2.7 
United Kingdom 30 17.1 
Croatia 21 1.48 
Hungary 40 1.45 
Ireland 2 26 
Italy 2,275 1.61 
Luxembourg 5 1.8 
Latvia 3 1 
Netherlands 9 25.22 
Poland 45 2.53 
Portugal 320 1.36 
Romania 8 1.13 
Sweden 959 1.47 
Slovenia 94 1.61 
Slovakia 116 1.53 
Total 7,012 2.04 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on linked data from Orbis and WIOT data sets. 
Table 5 below shows the distribution of the number of parent firms and integrated inputs by industry. The 
largest number of parent firms are in two industries: food, beverages and tobacco; and fabricated metal 
products. Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products has the lowest number of parent firms and 
the largest average number of integrated inputs. The lowest average number of integrated inputs is in wood 
and wood products; and repair and installation of machinery and equipment.  
 
                                                          
6 The distribution of parent companies (GUOs), in both manufacturing and services, is driven by the sample of firms 
available in Orbis. In particular, the availability of firms’ financials determines the number of firms in each country. 
Since data on the population of parent firms in EU countries is not available, all regressions in the empirical analysis 
include home country-input-output industry fixed effects.    
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Table 5: The distribution of parent companies and the intensity of integrated inputs - manufacturing firms   
WIOT sector of parent company (GUO) Number of GUOs Mean number of integrated inputs 
Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
products 1,104 1.97 
Manufacture of textiles, wearing apparel and leather products 483 1.61 
Manufacture of wood and of products of wood and cork, 
except furniture; manufacture of articles of straw and plaiting 
materials 
264 1.39 
Manufacture of paper and paper products 132 3.28 
Printing and reproduction of recorded media 242 1.82 
Manufacture of coke and refined petroleum products 26 4.92 
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 310 2.34 
Manufacture of basic pharmaceutical products and 
pharmaceutical preparations 82 2.78 
Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 360 2.02 
Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 386 2.02 
Manufacture of basic metals 176 2.94 
Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery 
and equipment 1,104 1.55 
Manufacture of computer, electronic and optical products 312 2.52 
Manufacture of electrical equipment 260 2.23 
Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 870 2.52 
Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 145 2.54 
Manufacture of other transport equipment 90 3.63 
Manufacture of furniture; other manufacturing 411 1.65 
Repair and installation of machinery and equipment 255 1.39 
Total 7,012 2.04 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on linked data from Orbis and WIOT data sets. 
 
3.2 The intensity of  intra-EU production linkages  
The ownership information about integrated inputs can be analysed also with respect to the relevance of 
production inputs, i.e., exploiting the information about the magnitude of the input-output coefficient 
ihjca (the value of input i in host country h required to produce one unit (€1) of production in industry j in 
home country c). 
Table 6 reports the average ihjca coefficient across various sub-samples. First, it is evident that the average 
importance in the production of integrated inputs is by far larger than that of possible outsourced inputs; 
in other words, manufacturing headquarters decide to integrate inputs corresponding to a larger value of 
their output.  
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Restricting the focus of the analysis on integrated inputs only, the importance of inputs in production is 
largest for manufacturing inputs sourced by manufacturing headquarters. The remaining subgroup of 
linkages, across services and manufacturing, show a lower average input-output coefficient.  
Table 6 also shows the results of a sensitivity analysis. The average input intensity is computed on various 
cuts of the ihjca distribution, with similar findings. The most noticeable difference across columns is the 
sharp reduction in the number of possible outsourced inputs: concentrating on the top quartile of the ihjca
distribution reduces a great deal the number of possible outsourcing links identified by the input-output 
tables. Most of the integrated inputs instead correspond to the top quartile of the distribution, as expected 
from the finding that headquarters tend to integrate affiliates in sectors which contribute substantially to 
the final output. 
Table 6: Intensity of integrated inputs 
  I-O requirement coefficients >0 
Top 3 quartiles of I-O 
requirement 
coefficients 
Top quartile of I-O 
requirement 
coefficients 
  No. of inputs* 
Avg. I-O 
coefficient 
No. of 
inputs* 
Avg. I-O 
coefficient 
No. of 
inputs* 
Avg. I-O 
coefficient 
Manufacturing headquarters             
Integrated inputs 14,245 0.0476 14,174 0.0478 13,291 0.051 
Possible outsourced inputs 10,478,237 0.0006 7,784,459 0.0008 2,573,177 0.0024 
Among integrated links:             
Manufacturing - Services 3,244 0.0262 3,235 0.0262 3,132 0.0271 
Manufacturing- Manufacturing 2,390 0.1237 2,389 0.1237 2,361 0.1252 
Manufacturing – both 8,068 0.034 8,008 0.0343 7,269 0.0378 
Manufacturing– neither 543 0.0425 542 0.0426 529 0.0436 
Total 14,245 0.0476 14,174 0.0478 13,291 0.051 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on linked data from Orbis and WIOT data sets.  
Notes: The I-O requirement coefficient is computed exploiting the full dimension of the WIOT table over the 28 EU 
countries. In this way, each sector in each country is considered as an input for the output of a certain sector in a 
certain country. *These are “unique inputs”: since large GUOs tend to have more than one affiliate in the same 
industry, to avoid double counting the I-O coefficient and inflate the figures towards the integration decision of large 
GUOs, in the above table, any specific input identified for each GUO is counted only once.   
In the empirical analysis, the intensity of integrated inputs will be exploited as an outcome variable 
additional to the binary variable for the sourcing choice . Country level determinants of integration or 
outsourcing can also affect the choice of which input to integrate. For this purpose, we construct a measure 
of average integration specific to each parent firm g in each host country h as follows: 
 
𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ = 1𝐼𝐼 �𝛼𝛼𝑔𝑔ℎ𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔𝐼𝐼
𝑔𝑔=1
 
(1) 
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4 Determinants of Intra-EU Production Linkages  
The focus of this analysis is on the sourcing strategies of EU manufacturing companies. Specifically, we 
examine determinants of integration versus outsourcing choices of manufacturing companies located in the 
EU countries. We consider integrated manufacturing and services inputs and focus on integrated inputs 
across EU countries. For the purpose of this analysis, we combine information on ownership from the 
Orbis data set with data from I-O tables for EU countries available from the WIOT database.   
The empirical analysis is based on estimates obtained with the following linear probability model:    
 Pr�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ = 1� = 𝛼𝛼 +� 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ
𝑟𝑟
+� 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶ℎ +� 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔ℎ + 𝜂𝜂𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔 + 𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ
𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡
 (2) 
The dependent variable is a binary indicator taking value 1 if parent firm g in sector j in home country c 
owns an affiliate in sector i in host country h, and 0 otherwise. gjcihX  is a vector of firm characteristics 
including productivity, tangible and intangible capital intensities, skill intensity and size. hC  is a vector of 
host country characteristics, including tangible, intangible and human capital intensities, production costs 
(proxied by GDP per capita) and size (GDP). ihP  is a vector of policy variables specific to the host country 
h: these include institutional characteristics such as the quality of contracts’ enforcement (rule of law), 
employment protection legislation, financial development, contractual frictions (efficiency of procedures 
for solving insolvency), as well as restrictions to FDI and entrepreneurship (sectoral restrictions to FDI, 
the impact of services regulations, and barriers to entrepreneurship).7  
cjiη  denotes a set of home country output-input industry fixed effects. These fixed effects pick up any 
unobservable feature specific to each NACE 2-digit output-input pair in each country of residence of the 
parent firm which affects the propensity of firms to choose to source inputs from within the boundaries of 
the firms rather than non-related suppliers. gjcihε  is a white noise model residual. Detailed descriptions of 
the variables and data sources are given in Table A1 in the Appendix. Table A2 in the Appendix shows the 
performance of EU countries relative to the EU average for the institutional and regulatory indicators used 
in the empirical analysis: employment protection legislation (EPL) for regular contracts;  employment 
protection legislation (EPL) for temporary contracts; the impact of service regulations in downstream 
industries; sectoral restrictions to FDI; barriers to entrepreneurship; product market regulations (PMR); 
rule of law; domestic bank credit to private sector (measuring financial development); time to resolve 
insolvency (measuring contractual frictions).    
As mentioned in section 3, besides the decision to integrate or outsource inputs, we also consider the 
intensity of integrated inputs in production as an additional outcome variable. For this purpose, we estimate 
the following model: 
 Pr�𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝐼𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ� = 𝛼𝛼 +� 𝛽𝛽𝑟𝑟𝑋𝑋𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ
𝑟𝑟
+� 𝛿𝛿𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶ℎ +� 𝛾𝛾𝑞𝑞𝑃𝑃𝑔𝑔ℎ + 𝜂𝜂𝑔𝑔𝑗𝑗𝑔𝑔 + 𝜀𝜀𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔𝑔ℎ
𝑞𝑞𝑡𝑡
 (3) 
where the dependent variable corresponds to the average I-O share of integrated inputs for each parent 
firm g in each host country h.8  
                                                          
7 All the policy variables are host country specific, with the exception of the restrictions to FDI and the impact of 
services restrictions, which vary over sectors within the host country. 
8 A concern in relation to specifications (3) and (4) is that causality might run from sourcing choices and the intensity 
of vertical integration to firm performance (productivity, size, capital and skill intensities). Unfortunately, with the 
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4.1 Determinants of  sourcing choices of  manufacturing firms 
Table 7 shows estimated determinants of the propensity of manufacturing firms to integrate manufacturing 
and service inputs from industries other than the industry of the parent company based on the model 
specification described above. The estimates are marginal effects obtained with linear probability estimators. 
All regressions include parent country input-output industry fixed effects. Standard errors are clustered at 
parent country – output industry. The identification in the empirical strategy is based on exogenous 
variation across host countries within the group of parent country input-output links. As explained above, 
to alleviate concerns about reverse causality, we also remove firm specific variation (with parent firm fixed 
effects).9  The results hold, indicating the meaningful variation is indeed where it matters for the scope of 
this analysis, i.e. across destination countries for foreign affiliates.  
Column 1 shows the estimates for all manufacturing parent firms while Columns 2-4 consider the 
exclusively defined manufacturing parent groups depending on the type of integrated inputs: manufacturing 
only, services only, and manufacturing and services.10  
Manufacturing firms that integrate inputs via foreign direct investment across EU countries are larger, more 
productive, more intensive in tangible and intangible capital and less intensive in skills than manufacturing 
firms that outsource inputs.  
Affiliates of manufacturing parent firms are likely to be located in large countries, in countries with lower 
production costs, with lower intensity of production factors (tangible, intangible, and human capital). The 
probability of sourcing inputs from affiliates across EU countries is higher in countries with strong legal 
systems, more flexible labour markets (less stringent employment protection legislation for regular 
contracts), lower corporate tax rates and less developed financial markets. Our estimates also indicate that 
manufacturing firms tend to locate in countries with high corporate tax rates and more developed financial 
systems. This result suggests that multinationals tend to borrow in countries with developed financial 
systems with high corporate tax rates where they can benefit from debt-related tax allowances. Further, 
manufacturing firms tend to source their inputs via foreign direct investment rather than via arm’s length 
transactions in countries where contractual frictions are high (less efficient insolvency procedures). Sectoral 
restrictions to FDI decrease the probability of sourcing inputs via FDI while service regulations with a high 
impact on downstream industries increases the propensity of manufacturing firms to source inputs via FDI.  
Finally, barriers to entrepreneurship in host countries do not seem to matter for the sourcing choice of 
manufacturing firms.    
The estimates across columns 2-4 highlight different sourcing behaviours of manufacturing parent firms 
depending on the type of sourced inputs. With respect to firm characteristics, it appears that the average 
effects obtained for all manufacturing firms are driven by manufacturing firms which integrate both 
                                                          
available data, it is not possible to find instrumental variables that could isolate the causal link between firm 
characteristics and integration decisions. Furthermore, while ownership vary over time, the information available in 
the Orbis data set corresponds to the most recent ownership information for 2017 and changes over time are not 
recorded. In order to mitigate reverse causality concerns, we therefore resorted to a “within-parent firm” estimation, 
exploiting cross-country variation within parent firms, in order to net out any time constant unobservable parent 
company characteristic which could be correlated with both the likelihood (and the intensity) of integration and the 
other regressors in the models. While this procedure does not allow to estimate the firm level parameters ( rβ  ), it 
reassures that the model is correctly specified and free of reverse causality.  These results are reported in Tables A3-
A4 in the Appendix and show that the main findings concerning the country characteristics leading to the decision to 
integrate or outsource inputs are upheld. 
9 These estimates are reported in Tables A3-A4 in the Appendix.   
10 The observations in column 1 of Tables 7 and 8 below are larger than the sum of the observations in columns 2, 3 
and 4. This is because in column 1 parent companies with affiliates in sectors other than manufacturing and services 
are also included (i.e. primary sectors and construction). 
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manufacturing and services inputs. Larger firms are more likely to source inputs intra-firm rather than at 
arms’ length regardless of the type of input category. Apart from parents’ size, production factor intensities 
and productivity do not matter for the sourcing choices of manufacturing firms integrating manufacturing 
inputs only. In contrast, manufacturing firms which source services inputs intra-firm are likely to be more 
productive, and more intensive in intangible capital than manufacturing firms which source inputs via 
outsourcing while tangible capital and skills intensities do not seem to matter.   
Host countries’ factor intensities have similar effects on the sourcing choices of the different groups of 
manufacturing parent firms in terms of direction with weaker effects again in the case of manufacturing 
firms with integrated manufacturing inputs only. With respect to institutional and regulatory characteristics, 
similarities include the positive link between the propensity to source inputs via FDI and the strength of 
legal systems, less stringent employment protection regulations for regular contracts, less developed 
domestic financial markets, higher contractual frictions (less efficient insolvency procedures), and a high 
impact of service regulations on downstream industries.  There are a number of dissimilarities across the 
three manufacturing parent firms’ categories. While more flexible regulations for the use of temporary 
contracts increase the propensity to source inputs via FDI in the case of manufacturing firms which 
integrate both manufacturing and services, the effect is opposite for manufacturing firms which integrate 
services only and manufacturing only. This result could be linked to the fact that across the EU countries 
for which data is available, the correlation between EPL for regular contracts and EPL for temporary 
contracts is low, 0. 3664. This low correlation implies that the strictness of regulations for regular and 
temporary contracts may be opposite to each other. For example, countries with more restrictive EPL for 
regular contracts and less restrictive EPL for the use of temporary contracts include the Czech Republic, 
Germany, the Netherlands and Sweden. At the other side of the spectrum, countries with less stringent 
EPL regulations for regular contracts and more restrictive EPL regulations for the use of temporary 
contracts include Estonia, Spain, Greece, Slovakia and Poland. The estimates in columns 2 and 3 suggest 
that manufacturing firms which integrate manufacturing inputs only and services inputs only are more likely 
to source them via affiliates with less stringent EPL regulations for permanent contracts and more stringent 
EPL for the use of the temporary contracts. These results suggest that sourcing inputs via affiliates would 
be less dependent on temporary contracts. However, it appears that adjustment to shocks in the case of 
sourcing inputs intra-firm would be expected via flexibility of labour markets with respect to permanent 
employment contracts.       
While barriers to domestic entrepreneurship increase the propensity of manufacturing firms with integrated 
services to source inputs via FDI, they do not matter for the other two groups of manufacturing parent 
firms.  Low corporate tax rates and less developed domestic financial markets increase the integration 
probability of manufacturing firms with services affiliates only and of manufacturing firms with both 
manufacturing and services affiliates.  
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Table 7: Determinants of sourcing choices for manufacturing firms, intra-EU vertical production linkages   
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
All Man HQ Man HQ – Serv. Affiliates 
Man HQ – Man. 
Affiliates 
Man HQ – Man & 
Serv. Affiliates 
Parent firm characteristics     
Productivity  0.000369*** 0.0000868*** 0.00000463 0.00109** 
 (0.000120) (0.0000241) (0.00000790) (0.000430) 
Tangible capital intensity  0.000263*** 0.00000305 0.00000668 0.00128*** 
 (0.0000860) (0.0000163) (0.00000502) (0.000434) 
Intangible capital intensity  0.000394*** 0.0000641** 0.00000973 0.000612* 
 (0.000147) (0.0000263) (0.00000622) (0.000331) 
Skills intensity -0.000940*** -0.0000650 -0.0000200 -0.00153** 
 (0.000287) (0.0000477) (0.0000134) (0.000754) 
Size  0.00119*** 0.000183*** 0.0000409*** 0.00276*** 
 (0.000226) (0.0000300) (0.0000119) (0.000515) 
Host country characteristics     
Tangible capital intensity -0.00118* -0.000391** -0.0000810 -0.00458** 
 (0.000600) (0.000174) (0.0000673) (0.00214) 
Human capital  -0.000808* -0.00131*** -0.000227*** -0.00161 
 (0.000427) (0.000173) (0.0000623) (0.00175) 
R&D intensity  -0.000419* 0.0000391 -0.00000118 -0.00158* 
 (0.000221) (0.000110) (0.0000387) (0.000859) 
GDP per capita  -0.000439*** -0.0000615 -0.0000278 -0.00156*** 
 (0.000100) (0.0000472) (0.0000219) (0.000298) 
GDP  0.000530*** 0.000205*** 0.0000433*** 0.00184*** 
 (0.0000722) (0.0000346) (0.0000112) (0.000232) 
Rule of law  0.00311*** 0.00133*** 0.000276*** 0.0109*** 
 (0.000661) (0.000202) (0.0000858) (0.00227) 
EPL for regular contracts -0.00183** -0.00107*** -0.000213*** -0.00521** 
 (0.000732) (0.000191) (0.0000747) (0.00233) 
EPL for temporary contracts  -0.000587 0.000568*** 0.0000951** -0.00314** 
 (0.000383) (0.000146) (0.0000459) (0.00134) 
Corporate tax rate -0.0186*** -0.00528*** -0.000558 -0.0676*** 
 (0.00342) (0.00139) (0.000448) (0.0111) 
Financial development  -0.0155*** -0.00413*** -0.000452 -0.0568*** 
 (0.00289) (0.00106) (0.000357) (0.00957) 
Corporate tax rate x 0.00460*** 0.00123*** 0.000119 0.0168*** 
Financial development  (0.000857) (0.000323) (0.000109) (0.00279) 
Time to resolve insolvency   0.000575*** 0.000234*** 0.0000879*** 0.00208*** 
 (0.000210) (0.0000839) (0.0000326) (0.000786) 
Sectoral restrictions to FDI -0.00561*** -0.0000298 -0.000500** -0.0217*** 
 (0.00137) (0.000467) (0.000197) (0.00451) 
Impact of service regulations 0.00657** 0.00164*** 0.000335*** 0.0217** 
 (0.00271) (0.000414) (0.0000968) (0.00949) 
Barriers to entrepreneurship  -0.0000220 0.000677*** -0.00000376 -0.000390 
 (0.000438) (0.000230) (0.0000800) (0.00178) 
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Constant 0.0603*** 0.0192*** 0.00247 0.213*** 
 (0.0120) (0.00458) (0.00157) (0.0391) 
Observations 7,118,505 2,708,351 2,228,720 1,641,837 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on linked data from the Orbis and WIOT data sets.   
Notes: Estimates are obtained with linear probability estimators. The dependent variable is equal to 1 if parent company 
integrates inputs intra-firm via foreign direct investment and 0 otherwise. All continuous explanatory variables are in 
natural logarithms. All regressions include parent country input-output industry fixed effects. Standard errors in 
parentheses clustered at parent country-output industry level.' p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
 
4.2 Determinants of  the intensity of  integrated inputs  
Table 8 shows the estimates for determinants of the intensity of integrated inputs by manufacturing parent 
firms across EU countries. Column 1 shows the estimates for all manufacturing parent firms while columns 
2-4 present the results for the three exclusively defined manufacturing parent firms groups discussed above. 
The dependent variable is the average intensity of integrated inputs defined in section 3.2. The estimates 
are obtained with OLS with fixed effects. The identification empirical strategy is based on variation across 
host countries within each parent country input-output combination.  
In comparison to the estimates for the sourcing choice discussed above, firm characteristics are less 
important for the intensity of integrated inputs by manufacturing firms. The only significant effect, albeit 
only marginally significant, is for skills intensity. The average intensity of integrated inputs is negatively 
linked to parent firms’ skills intensity.  With respect to host country characteristics, the average intensity of 
intra-EU integrated inputs is higher in large countries, in countries with higher R&D intensity and higher 
GDP per capita and lower in countries more intensive in tangible capital.  
Similarly to the sourcing choices for manufacturing firms, the intensity of integrated inputs is higher in 
countries with stronger legal systems, low corporate tax rates, less developed domestic financial markets 
and in countries with higher contractual frictions (less efficient procedures to resolve insolvency). Barriers 
to FDI, the impact of services regulations on downstream industries, and barriers to entrepreneurship in 
the host countries do not affect significantly the intensity of integration inputs.  
Looking across columns 2-4 at the three categories of manufacturing parent firms, with the exception of 
tangible capital and skills intensities, the intensity of integrated inputs does not seem to be sensitive to firm 
characteristics. Tangible capital intensity is negatively linked with the intensity of integrated inputs in the 
case of manufacturing firms with integrated manufacturing inputs only while the intensity of skills is 
negatively linked with the intensity of integrated services inputs by manufacturing parent firms.  
Table 8: Determinants of the intensity of integrated inputs by manufacturing firms, intra-EU vertical production linkages  
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
  
All 
Manufacturing 
HQ 
Man HQ – Serv. 
Affiliates 
Man HQ – Man. 
Affiliates 
Man HQ – Man 
& Serv. Affiliates 
Parent firm characteristics     
Productivity  0.000212 0.000330 0.00322 0.0000786 
 (0.000244) (0.000232) (0.00319) (0.000323) 
Tangible capital intensity  0.0000724 -0.0000479 -0.000322** 0.0000540 
 (0.000106) (0.0000573) (0.000156) (0.000188) 
Intangible capital intensity  0.0000706 0.0000665 -0.00130 0.0000985 
 (0.0000647) (0.0000782) (0.000837) (0.0000844) 
Skills intensity -0.000705* -0.00124*** -0.00116 -0.000567 
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 (0.000403) (0.000475) (0.00292) (0.000518) 
Size  -0.0000137 0.000000224 0.00120 -0.0000440 
 (0.0000649) (0.0000797) (0.000747) (0.0000853) 
Host country characteristics     
Tangible capital intensity -0.00395*** -0.00178 -0.0915** -0.00466*** 
 (0.00143) (0.00239) (0.0344) (0.00171) 
Human capital  -0.00108 0.000472 -0.00506*** -0.00153 
 (0.00124) (0.00156) (0.00190) (0.00138) 
R&D intensity  0.00104* 0.00177* -0.0164 0.00105 
 (0.000593) (0.00102) (0.0128) (0.000721) 
GDP per capita  0.000584* 0.00108* 0.0295** 0.000434 
 (0.000326) (0.000588) (0.0134) (0.000408) 
GDP  0.000621*** 0.000839*** -0.00663* 0.000570*** 
 (0.000105) (0.000163) (0.00343) (0.000123) 
Rule of law  0.00415*** 0.00186 0.0496** 0.00456*** 
 (0.00112) (0.00203) (0.0203) (0.00127) 
 0.0000276 -0.000342 -0.0117*** 0.0000765 
EPL for regular contracts (0.000923) (0.00141) (0.00369) (0.00104) 
 -0.000486 0.000932 0.00916** -0.000851 
EPL for temporary contracts  (0.000679) (0.000880) (0.00360) (0.000752) 
Corporate tax rate -0.0199*** 0.0000281 -0.196*** -0.0216** 
 (0.00711) (0.0159) (0.0673) (0.00830) 
Financial development  -0.0186*** -0.000379 -0.172*** -0.0204*** 
 (0.00590) (0.0129) (0.0614) (0.00682) 
Corporate tax rate x 0.00508*** -0.000252 0.0447*** 0.00561*** 
Financial development  (0.00175) (0.00386) (0.0154) (0.00201) 
Time to resolve insolvency   0.00156*** 0.00202*** 0.0400** 0.00137*** 
 (0.000398) (0.000724) (0.0164) (0.000436) 
 
Sectoral restrictions to FDI 
 
-0.00323 
 
-0.00306 
0 
.0601 
 
-0.00179 
 (0.00298) (0.00522) (0.0369) (0.00322) 
Impact of service regulations -0.00324 -0.00764 -0.518** -0.00171 
 (0.00309) (0.0186) (0.255) (0.00323) 
Barriers to entrepreneurship  0.00191 0.00147 0.107** 0.00261 
 (0.00182) (0.00165) (0.0473) (0.00204) 
Constant 0.0752*** -0.00825 0.884*** 0.0857*** 
 (0.0264) (0.0610) (0.304) (0.0311) 
Observations 5,273 785 143 4,309 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on linked data from Orbis and WIOT data sets.   
Notes: Estimates are obtained with OLS estimators. The dependent variable and all continuous explanatory variables 
are in natural logarithms. All regressions include parent country input-output industry fixed effects. Standard errors 
in parentheses clustered at parent country-output industry level.' p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
The intensity of integrated inputs by manufacturing firms appears to be most sensitive to host country 
characteristics in the case of manufacturing firms which integrate manufacturing inputs only. There are 
both similarities and differences across the three categories of manufacturing firms. GDP per capita is 
positively linked to the intensity of integrated inputs for manufacturing firms integrating manufacturing 
only and services only and it does not matter for the intensity of integrated manufacturing and services. 
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The intensity of integrated inputs is higher in larger countries in the case of manufacturing firms with 
services affiliates only and manufacturing firms with both services and manufacturing affiliates. In contrast, 
the intensity of integrated inputs for manufacturing firms with manufacturing affiliates only is higher in 
smaller countries. While the R&D intensity of host countries increases the intensity of integrated inputs in 
the case of manufacturing firms with services affiliates only, it does not matter in the case of the other 
manufacturing parent groups. Tangible capital intensity is negatively linked to the intensity of integrated 
inputs in the case of manufacturing firms with manufacturing affiliates only and manufacturing firms with 
both manufacturing and services affiliates. The intensity of integrated inputs in the case of manufacturing 
firms with manufacturing affiliates only is higher in the countries with less educated work forces.  
Looking further at the sensitivity of the intensity of integrated inputs by manufacturing firms to institutional 
and regulatory characteristics in host countries, again this appears to be higher in the case of manufacturing 
firms with manufacturing affiliates only.  
The strength of the legal systems is positively linked with the intensity of integrated inputs in the case of 
manufacturing firms with manufacturing affiliates only and in the case of manufacturing firms with both 
manufacturing and services affiliates. It does not seem to matter for manufacturing firms with service 
affiliates only. Less stringent employment protection regulations for regular contracts and more stringent 
regulations for the use of temporary contracts increase the intensity of integrated inputs for manufacturing 
firms with manufacturing affiliates only. Labour market regulations do not seem to matter for the intensity 
of integrated inputs in the case of the other two manufacturing parent categories. The intensity of integrated 
inputs is larger in countries with lower corporate tax rates and less developed financial systems in the case 
of manufacturing firms with manufacturing affiliates only and manufacturing firms with both 
manufacturing and services affiliates. Consistent with the results for the sourcing choices, the intensity of 
integrated inputs is higher in countries with higher corporate tax rates and higher financial development. 
The estimate is positive and significant again for manufacturing firms with manufacturing affiliates only 
and for manufacturing firms with both manufacturing and services affiliates. The intensity of integrated 
inputs is larger in countries with higher contractual frictions (less efficient procedures to resolve insolvency). 
This result holds for all three manufacturing parent categories and it is consistent with the theoretical 
models predicting that contractual frictions increase the likelihood of intra-firm integration. While barriers 
to FDI do not seem to matter for the intensity of integrated inputs, the impact of service regulations in 
downstream industries reduces the intensity of integrated inputs in the case of manufacturing firms with 
manufacturing affiliates only.  Barriers to entrepreneurship in the host country increase the intensity of 
integrated inputs in the case of manufacturing firms with manufacturing affiliates only. This result is 
consistent with the prediction that the size of multinational activity is likely to be higher in countries with 
less domestic competition.   
5 Key Findings and Policy Implications  
This paper examines the extent and determinants of intra-EU production and trade linkages using firm-
level data for manufacturing. The key findings and their policy implications are discussed below.  
The descriptive analysis on productivity differentials across parent groups with different structures reveals 
systematic productivity differences between manufacturing parent firms integrating manufacturing and 
services inputs.  
Manufacturing firms that source inputs intra-firm via FDI across EU countries are larger, more productive, 
more intensive in tangible and intangible capital and less intensive in skills than manufacturing firms that 
source inputs at arm’s length.  
Affiliates of manufacturing firms are likely to be located in large countries, in countries with lower 
production costs, and with lower intensity of production factors (tangible, intangible, and human capital). 
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The probability of integrating inputs by manufacturing firms across EU countries is positively linked with 
the strength of legal systems, flexibility of labour markets (less stringent employment protection legislation 
for regular contracts), and negatively linked to corporate tax rates and financial development in host 
countries. Our estimates also indicate that manufacturing firms tend to locate in countries with high 
corporate tax rates and more developed financial systems. This result is consistent with the prediction of 
the literature on multinational activity and imperfect capital markets (Desai et al. 2004; Antràs et al. 2009) 
that affiliates are more likely to borrow in countries with high corporate tax rates where they can benefit 
from debt-related tax allowances. Less efficient insolvency procedures are associated with a higher 
probability of sourcing inputs via FDI relative to arm’s length sourcing. This result is consistent with the 
theoretical prediction that contractual frictions incentivises firms to source inputs intra-firm.  
The probability of sourcing inputs via FDI is negatively linked to sectoral restrictions to FDI and positively 
linked to the impact of service regulations on downstream industries.  Finally, barriers to entrepreneurship 
in host countries do not seem to matter for the sourcing choice of manufacturing firms.    
These results seem to be driven by manufacturing firms with more complex integration strategies – 
integrating both manufacturing and services inputs. Further, this analysis highlights both similarities and 
differences in the integration behaviour across the three categories of manufacturing parent firms 
depending on the type of integrated inputs. In terms of institutional and regulatory factors, the similarities 
include the positive links between the propensity to source inputs via FDI and the strength of legal systems, 
less stringent employment protection legislation for regular contracts, less developed financial markets, 
higher contractual frictions, and a higher impact of service regulations on downstream industries.  
A number of other institutional factors have different impacts on the propensity of manufacturing firms to 
source different inputs. Manufacturing firms with both manufacturing and services affiliates are more likely 
to source inputs via FDI from countries with more flexible regulations for the use of temporary contracts. 
In contrast, manufacturing firms with manufacturing affiliates only and services affiliates only are more 
likely to source inputs from countries with stricter regulations for the use of temporary contracts. 
Manufacturing firms which source services only are more likely to source them via affiliates in countries 
with higher barriers to entrepreneurship. In contrast, barriers to entrepreneurship do not matter for the 
sourcing choices of manufacturing parent firms with manufacturing inputs only and with both 
manufacturing and services inputs. Low corporate tax rates and less developed financial markets increase 
the propensity to source inputs via FDI in the case of manufacturing firms with services inputs only and 
manufacturing firms with both manufacturing and services inputs while these factors do not matter for the 
sourcing choices of manufacturing firms with manufacturing inputs only.            
In comparison to the estimates for the sourcing choice discussed above, firm characteristics are less 
important for the intensity of integrated inputs by manufacturing firms. The average intensity of intra-EU 
integrated inputs by manufacturing firms is higher in large countries, in countries with higher R&D intensity 
and higher GDP per capita. It is lower in countries more intensive in tangible capital.  
Similarly to the sourcing choices for manufacturing firms, the intensity of integrated inputs is higher from 
sourcing countries with stronger legal systems, low corporate tax rates, less developed domestic financial 
markets and in countries with less efficient procedures to resolve insolvency. Barriers to FDI, the impact 
of services regulations on downstream industries, and barriers to entrepreneurship in the host countries do 
not affect significantly the intensity of integration inputs by manufacturing firms.  
The intensity of integrated inputs by manufacturing firms appears to be most sensitive to host country 
characteristics including institutional and regulatory characteristics in the case of manufacturing firms which 
integrate manufacturing inputs only. The intensity of integrated inputs in the case of manufacturing parent 
firms with affiliates in manufacturing only is higher in countries with stronger legal systems, less stringent 
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EPL for regular contracts, more stringent EPL for temporary contracts, lower corporate tax rates, less 
developed financial markets, higher contractual frictions, lower barriers entrepreneurship, and a lower 
impact of service regulations on downstream industries. Over and above these effects, the intensity of 
integrated inputs by manufacturing firms with manufacturing affiliates only is higher in countries with 
higher corporate tax rates and more developed financial markets. In the case of manufacturing parent firms 
with services affiliates only, the intensity of integrated inputs is higher in countries with higher contractual 
frictions and it is not sensitive to other institutional and regulatory characteristics. In the case of 
manufacturing firms with both manufacturing and services affiliates, the intensity of integrated inputs is 
positively associated with the strength of legal systems, contractual frictions, low corporate tax rates, and 
less developed financial markets. Over and above these effects, the intensity of integrated inputs by 
manufacturing firms with both manufacturing and services affiliates is higher in countries with higher 
corporate tax rates and more developed financial markets  
Taken together, the results of this analysis suggest that strengthening the quality of legal systems, lowering 
barriers to FDI and increasing the flexibility of labour markets could enable and intensify the integration 
of production inputs across EU countries. Improving financial development and the efficiency of 
procedures for resolving insolvencies is likely to increase the likelihood of sourcing of inputs at arms’ length. 
Lowering barriers to entrepreneurship in host countries could foster sourcing of services inputs by 
manufacturing firms at arm’s length. Lowering service regulations across EU countries is likely to foster 
sourcing of inputs from downstream industries.  
Given the heterogeneity of institutional and regulatory characteristics of EU countries, such policy measures 
need to be tailored to country-specific conditions. The European Commission could play an important role 
in benchmarking and facilitating the adoption of best practices among EU Member States.   
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Appendix  
Table A1 Description of variables and data sources  
Variable Description Data source 
Firm-level variables      
Productivity  Value added per employee Orbis, Bureau van Dijk  
Tangible capital stock  Total fixed assets per employee Orbis, Bureau van Dijk 
Intangible capital stock  Total intangible fixed assets per employee Orbis, Bureau van Dijk 
Human capital Total labour cost per employee Orbis, Bureau van Dijk 
Size  Total number of employees Orbis, Bureau van Dijk 
Country factors     
Capital intensity  Gross fixed capital formation, % of GDP  The World Bank  
Human capital  Share of labour force with tertiary education  The World Bank  
R&D intensity  Private and public R&D expenditures (current and capital expenditures), % of GDP  The World Bank  
GDP per capita  GDP per inhabitant  The World Bank  
GDP  GDP  The World Bank  
Policy variables      
Rule of law 
Synthetic indicator capturing agents’ confidence in the 
quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the 
police  and the court, the likelihood of crime and 
violence  
The World Bank 
EPL for regular contracts Synthetic indicator measuring the strictness of regulations on dismissals for regular contracts OECD 
EPL for temporary 
contracts  
Synthetic indicator measuring the strictness of 
regulations on the use of temporary contracts OECD 
Financial development  Domestic bank credit to the private sector, % of GDP   The World Bank  
Efficiency of insolvency  Number of days to solve insolvency  The World Bank  
Sectoral restrictions to 
FDI  
Index for the regulations’ restrictiveness to FDI – 
average across secondary and tertiary sectors OECD 
Impact of service 
regulations  
Synthetic indicator measuring the potential costs of anti-
competitive regulations in services on sectors that use 
the output of services as intermediate inputs in the 
production process 
OECD 
Égert and Wanner (2016) 
Barriers to 
entrepreneurship  Index for regulations’ restrictiveness to entrepreneurship  OECD 
 
 
  
 
Table A2 Institutional and regulatory performance of EU countries relative to the EU 
 
EPL regular 
contracts  
EPL 
temporary 
contracts  
Impact of 
service 
regulations 
Sectoral 
restrictions to 
FDI  
Barriers to 
entrepreneurship  
PMR 
total  
Rule of 
Law 
Labor Market 
Regulations 
Domestic Bank 
Credits to Private 
Sector ( % to GDP) 
Time to 
resolve 
Insolvency 
AT 1.061 0.735 0.894 3.347 0.777 0.827 1.661 0.834 0.973 0.558 
BE 0.848 1.330 1.048 1.240 1.056 0.961 1.283 1.055 0.642 0.457 
BG n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.008 1.092 -0.066 1.079 0.657 1.674 
CY n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.240 1.144 0.899 1.139 2.762 0.761 
CZ 1.310 0.805 1.173 0.345 1.079 0.975 0.964 1.182 0.549 1.065 
DE 1.200 0.630 0.558 0.848 0.981 0.891 1.572 0.872 0.875 0.609 
DK 0.985 0.770 0.809 0.942 0.747 0.839 1.777 1.102 1.948 0.507 
EE 0.811 1.680 1.552 0.476 0.925 0.896 1.158 0.881 0.752 1.522 
ES 0.917 1.435 0.869 0.457 1.248 1.000 0.795 0.814 1.427 0.761 
FI 0.971 0.875 1.261 0.587 0.917 0.897 1.800 0.814 1.032 0.457 
FR 1.068 2.030 1.140 1.753 0.999 1.018 1.245 0.838 1.042 0.964 
UK 0.491 0.210 0.328 1.557 0.881 0.752 1.602 1.192 1.526 0.507 
GR 0.949 1.260 1.072 1.063 1.135 1.207 0.293 0.664 1.286 1.775 
HR n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.178 1.439 0.264 0.999 0.764 1.572 
HU 0.711 0.700 0.762 0.531 1.004 0.921 0.422 0.969 0.476 1.014 
IE 0.626 0.350 1.047 1.604 1.173 1.009 1.529 1.071 0.897 0.203 
IT 1.200 1.120 1.010 1.744 0.726 0.894 0.286 0.977 0.981 0.913 
LT n/a n/a n/a 1.110 0.931 1.051 0.769 1.161 0.452 1.167 
LU 1.006 2.100 1.021 0.065 1.017 1.011 1.609 0.884 1.010 1.014 
LV n/a n/a n/a 0.755 1.207 1.115 0.734 1.133 0.566 0.761 
MT n/a n/a n/a n/a 1.296 1.087 1.024 1.138 1.158 1.522 
NL 1.264 0.525 0.756 0.653 0.708 0.635 1.682 1.086 1.278 0.558 
PL 0.999 0.980 1.221 1.632 0.971 1.143 0.694 1.141 0.576 1.522 
PT 1.426 1.015 1.047 0.168 0.801 0.898 0.959 0.902 1.427 1.014 
RO n/a n/a n/a 0.149 1.225 1.170 0.127 1.070 0.343 1.674 
SE 1.168 0.455 0.971 1.921 1.015 1.054 1.691 0.989 1.446 1.014 
SI 1.166 1.015 1.261 0.140 1.073 1.180 0.828 0.922 0.606 0.406 
SK 0.825 0.980 1.201 0.914 0.682 0.893 0.401 1.093 0.550 2.029 
Source: Authors calculations based on data provided by the OECD and the World Bank 
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Table A3 Determinants of sourcing choices for manufacturing firms, intra-EU vertical production linkages. Estimates with 
parent firms fixed effects.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All 
Manufacturing 
HQ 
Man HQ – Serv. 
Affiliates 
Man HQ – Man 
Affiliates 
Man HQ – Man 
& Serv. 
Affiliates 
Host country characteristics     
Tangible capital intensity  -0.00139** -0.000472*** 0.00000649 -0.00623*** 
 (0.000550) (0.000174) (0.0000660) (0.00238) 
     
Human capital  -0.000937** -0.00141*** -0.000134** -0.00228 
 (0.000417) (0.000173) (0.0000595) (0.00183) 
     
R&D intensity  -0.000422* -0.0000293 0.0000422 -0.00167* 
 (0.000229) (0.000106) (0.0000369) (0.000937) 
     
GDP per capita  -0.000470*** -0.0000892* -0.0000200 -0.00186*** 
 (0.000104) (0.0000480) (0.0000212) (0.000410) 
     
GDP  0.000519*** 0.000184*** 0.0000547*** 0.00191*** 
 (0.0000701) (0.0000332) (0.0000118) (0.000258) 
     
Rule of law  0.00335*** 0.00147*** 0.000157** 0.0129*** 
 (0.000635) (0.000200) (0.0000760) (0.00271) 
     
EPL for regular contracts -0.00147** -0.000967*** -0.000179** -0.00497* 
 (0.000636) (0.000176) (0.0000719) (0.00274) 
     
EPL for temporary  -0.0000876 0.000729*** 0.000120*** -0.00178 
contracts (0.000308) (0.000147) (0.0000439) (0.00128) 
     
Corporate tax rate  -0.0164*** -0.00482*** 0.00000731 -0.0645*** 
 (0.00296) (0.00129) (0.000414) (0.0112) 
     
Financial development  -0.0135*** -0.00370*** 0.0000278 -0.0542*** 
 (0.00247) (0.000973) (0.000328) (0.00962) 
     
Corporate tax rate x 0.00398*** 0.00110*** -0.0000316 0.0159*** 
Financial development (0.000731) (0.000296) (0.000100) (0.00281) 
     
Time to solve insolvency  0.000579*** 0.000183** 0.000119*** 0.00226*** 
 (0.000203) (0.0000825) (0.0000337) (0.000845) 
     
Sectoral restrictions to FDI -0.000139 0.00327*** -0.00161*** -0.00398' 
 (0.000594) (0.000461) (0.000260) (0.00247) 
     
Impact of service  -0.00313*** -0.00123*** -0.000277*** -0.0112*** 
regulations (0.000403) (0.000152) (0.0000418) (0.00152) 
     
Barriers to 0.000324 0.000957*** -0.000153* 0.000729 
entrepreneurship (0.000418) (0.000240) (0.0000781) (0.00184) 
     
Constant 0.0579*** 0.0189*** 0.000199 0.230*** 
 (0.0105) (0.00427) (0.00144) (0.0421) 
Observations 7,310,487 2,803,345 2,282,961 1,665,815 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on linked data from Orbis and WIOT data sets.  Notes: Estimates are obtained with 
linear probability estimators. All continuous explanatory variables are in natural logarithms. All regressions include 
parent companies fixed effects and parent country input-output industry fixed effects. Standard errors in parentheses 
clustered at parent country-output industry level. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. 
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Table A4 Determinants of the intensity of integrated inputs by manufacturing firms, intra-EU vertical production linkages. 
Estimates with parent firms fixed effects.  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All 
Manufacturing 
HQ 
Man HQ – 
Serv. Affiliates 
Man HQ – Man 
Affiliates 
Man HQ –  
Man & Serv. 
Affiliates 
Host country characteristics     
Tangible capital intensity  -0.00493*** -0.00621* -0.00492 -0.00505*** 
 (0.00167) (0.00318) (0.00344) (0.00181) 
     
Human capital  -0.00105 0.00119 -0.00781*** -0.00120 
 (0.00138) (0.00195) (0.00154) (0.00144) 
     
R&D intensity  0.00125* 0.00222' 0 0.00121' 
 (0.000710) (0.00147) (.) (0.000771) 
     
GDP per capita  0.00115** 0.00195' -0.000891 0.00117** 
 (0.000446) (0.00123) (0.00136) (0.000480) 
     
GDP  0.000666*** 0.000799*** 0.00165*** 0.000650*** 
 (0.000113) (0.000238) (0.0000792) (0.000121) 
     
Rule of law  0.00401*** 0.00188 0 0.00413*** 
 (0.00131) (0.00232) (.) (0.00137) 
     
EPL for regular contracts 0.000504 0.0000565 -0.00118 0.000531 
 (0.00111) (0.00163) (0.000861) (0.00117) 
     
EPL for temporary contracts  -0.00132* 0.000945 0.00383** -0.00151* 
 (0.000757) (0.000981) (0.00165) (0.000799) 
     
Corporate tax rate  -0.0301** -0.00308 0 -0.0316** 
 (0.0127) (0.0178) (.) (0.0138) 
     
Financial development  -0.0268*** -0.00312 -0.000795 -0.0283** 
 (0.0101) (0.0143) (0.000736) (0.0109) 
     
Corporate tax rate x 0.00747** 0.000384 -0.000881*** 0.00788** 
Financial development (0.00300) (0.00425) (0.000260) (0.00324) 
     
Time to solve insolvency  0.00153*** 0.00309** -0.00429*** 0.00147** 
 (0.000539) (0.00145) (0.000945) (0.000566) 
     
Sectoral restrictions to FDI 0.000232 -0.000951 0.00416 0.000368 
 (0.00216) (0.00584) (0.00576) (0.00222) 
     
Impact of service  0.00123 -0.00192 -0.0417 0.00148 
regulations (0.00144) (0.00427) (0.0493) (0.00150) 
     
Barriers to entrepreneurship 0.00287' 0.00354 0 0.00300' 
 (0.00194) (0.00259) (.) (0.00203) 
     
Constant 0.108** 0.00592 0.0446** 0.115** 
 (0.0437) (0.0646) (0.0177) (0.0472) 
Observations 5,300 800 147 4,316 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on linked data from Orbis and WIOT data sets.  Notes: Estimates are obtained with 
OLS estimators. The dependent variable and all continuous explanatory variables are in natural logarithms. All 
regressions include parent company fixed effects, as well as country input-output industry fixed effects. Standard 
errors in parentheses clustered at parent country-output industry level.' p<0.15, * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01.  
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